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Immigration policy continues to be the subject of heated debate in American politics, the media and the public at large. One of the most contentious issues in the 2016 presidential election is whether immigration reform should include a path to citizenship for unauthorized immigrants in the United States -a population estimated at about 11.7 million in 2012 (Passel et al. 2013) . Special attention has been paid to the legality of President Obama's executive orders.
First among those orders is the 2012 Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which offers eligible immigrants a renewable two-year reprieve from deportation proceedings and work authorization. To explore the impact of authorization on the welfare of likely unauthorized immigrants, we use a quasi-experimental approach that focuses on the intent to treat and exploits the somewhat arbitrary criteria determining DACA eligibility. Our emphasis is on poverty given that unauthorized immigrants face poverty rates nearly twice as large as those of U.S.-born individuals (Passel and Cohn 2009) . While unauthorized immigrants are especially vulnerable, their households are also home to millions of citizen children.
Our identification strategy relies on the following observable criteria determining DACA eligibility: being younger than 31 years old in 2012, having arrived to the United States before age 16 and prior to 2007, and having the equivalent of a high school diploma or beyond.
Specifically, we exploit differences in one eligibility rule: being under the age of 31 in 2012, and compare individuals who share all other observable eligibility criteria. The sole difference between respondents in the treatment and controls groups is that the former were slightly 1 According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS, http://www.uscis.gov), an individual eligible for DACA must: (1) Be under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012; (2) We find evidence that DACA reduced the incidence of poverty by about 38 percent for eligible individuals. Our finding adds to a long-standing literature examining the impact of legalization under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act on immigrants (e.g. AmuedoDorantes et al., 2007) , with the important distinction that DACA only offers a temporary reprieve and work authorization and the program's continuity depends on the executive branch. . By limiting the age window to those between 27 and 34 years of age, we also restrict attention to those in close proximity to the age-eligibility threshold.
3 Finally, we focus on household heads, as they are likely to have the greatest impact on the family's poverty status. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample of 3,573 likely unauthorized household heads, of whom 42 percent fulfilled all of the observable DACA eligibility criteria noted earlier. Importantly, 28 percent of them lived in poor households. The incidence of near poverty was also high, with 47 percent living in households with family incomes that fell below 1.5 times the poverty line. By design, the mean age was close to the DACA threshold of 31 years of age (30.2) and the average age at migration was nine. About 52 percent were men, 63 percent were white, and 52 percent were married. Due to DACA's educational requirements, 70 percent of our sample had a high school-level education and 30 percent exceeded that educational attainment. On average, households had close to four family members. About 20 2 The official poverty indicator presents some drawbacks (Bitler, Hoynes, and Kuka 2014) . One is that it likely understates economic need. Thus, we also look at near poverty. In addition, the poverty line does not vary geographically, despite being inflation adjusted; hence we include state fixed-effects and state-time trends to capture differences in the cost of living across states. Finally, the poverty line only refers to money income before taxes. It does not include capital gains or noncash benefits. This is not likely to prove of relevance in our case given likely unauthorized immigrants appear less likely to apply for such benefits owing to their undocumented status (Watson 2014) . 3 These limitations imply that our estimate is specific to a sample of relatively educated individuals who arrived at young ages. While some may be concerned about the external validity of this assessment, DACA limited authorization to similar groups.
4 percent and 78 percent of immigrants, respectively, lived in states with some interior immigration enforcement or offering in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants.
Unemployment rates in their states averaged 8.5 percent. Table 2 reports difference-in-difference estimates of the impact of DACA on the wellbeing of Mexican non-citizens by exploring the change in the poverty exposure of DACAeligible household heads from before to after the program announcement, relative to the change experienced by their non-eligible counterparts. DACA appears to have served as a protective factor, as the non-eligible became 6.5 percentage points more likely to live in poverty, whereas their eligible counterparts did not. Hence, DACA eligibility is associated with a 9.3 percentage points or 33 percent reduction in the incidence of poverty. The point estimate for 'near poverty' is also negative, albeit not statistically different from zero.
II. Methodology
To examine the impact of DACA on poverty, we estimate equation (1) via OLS:
(1 Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (1) on our sample. As in Table 2 , we find that DACA reduced the incidence of poverty by 10.6 percentage points or, approximately, 38 percent of the sample average. 6 Because this is the lowest poverty bound, this estimated impact is also the largest and, while also negative, DACA does not appear to have significantly lowered the likelihood of living near poverty.
III. Assessing the Impact of DACA on Poverty
Our empirical strategy assumes that the treatment (DACA-eligible) and control (likely unauthorized DACA-ineligible) groups would have maintained parallel trends in the absence of treatment (DACA). 7 To investigate if that was the case, we interact the indicator for DACA 4 We create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state implemented an employment verification (E-Verify) mandate, an omnibus immigration law or signed a state-wide 287(g) agreement with Immigration Custom Enforcement (ICE). 5 Note that the inclusion of year fixed effects absorbs the main level effect of DACA ( ) in the equation. 6 State and year fixed-effects, as well as state-time trends, are by and large statistically significant. 7 Additionally, we assume any unobserved time-varying group effects are captured by the controls and treat individual-level observations as independent. eligibility with year indicators for each of the years prior to DACA in our sample (2009, 2010, and 2011) , and add these interaction terms to the right-hand-side of equation (1). We graph the resulting coefficients and confidence intervals, as well as the coefficient of interest ( × ) in Figure 1 . The results show no statistically significant impact of DACA eligibility prior to DACA's implementation as the confidence intervals on the coefficient estimates corresponding to the eligibility indicator interacted with those years prior to DACA's implementation always include zero. In fact, it is only in the post-DACA period that a decline in poverty is observed for the DACA-eligible relative to the ineligible comparison group. Thus, the estimated impact of DACA in Table 3 is not likely to be biased by pre-existing trends.
IV. Conclusion
Despite the short time period during which DACA has been in place and the uncertainty surrounding its durability, we find that authorization has allowed the families of DACA-eligible household heads to escape poverty. This finding supports the view that even temporary authorization programs, such as the expansion of DACA and DAPA -both currently blocked from implementation, confer important benefits to participants, their families and, in turn, their communities. The question remains whether the DACA program will continue after the upcoming presidential election and, if it does, whether its long-run impacts will differ. Notes: "Living in Poverty" refers to living in a household with a family income below the poverty line, whereas "Living in Near Poverty" refers to living in a household with a family income below 1.5 times the poverty line. Source: Authors' tabulations using the ACS 2009 ACS -2011 ACS , 2013 ACS -2014 . (2009, 2010, and 2011) . Note that the inclusion of all interaction terms absorbs the main effect of eligibility status, which is thus omitted from the specification. Other covariates include: age and age-atarrival dummies, gender, race, marital status and educational attainment of the household head; family size; and controls for the level of state immigration enforcement, the existence of 'instate tuition for undocumented immigrants' and the unemployment rate in the state where the migrant resides. Coefficients and 95% CIs from Poverty Regression
